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ABSTRACT  
 
For many social scientists government intervention is linked to low levels of social trust and 
corruption, while, on the contrary, for others government intervention is associated with high trust 
and low corruption. We aim to reconcile these contrasting findings by distinguishing the opposing 
effects of trust over two alternative types of government intervention: regulation and redistribution. 
We argue that low-trust individuals demand more governmental regulation (H1) but less government 
redistribution (H2). And the effects of trust over policy preferences are conditional on the quality of 
institutions. The higher the level of quality of government in a particular region, the more high-
trusting individuals will like government redistribution and will dislike government regulation that 
restricts the operations of free markets (H3). We test these hypotheses with data from the latest round 
of the European Quality of Government Index survey, which covers 77,000 individuals from 185 
regions of 21 EU Member States. 
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 Introduction 
 
Both political scientists (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Rothstein 2011) and economists (Alesina and 
Angeletos 2005b; Aghion et al. 2010; Pinotti 2012) have revisited the relationship between culture and 
institutions explored in many classical sociological studies from Banfield (1958) to Putnam (1993). 
That is, they have explored the extent that values prevailing in a society are related to its political 
institutions. And, in particular, they examine if the levels of social trust lead to a smaller or bigger 
government. Yet the responses point in contrasting directions. For some scholars, government 
intervention is linked to low trust and corruption. Others claim the opposite.  
On the one hand, some researchers argue that a society where individuals trust each other is 
correlated with low levels of corruption and, in turn, with citizens who are more willing to support a 
highly redistributive welfare state (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). Irrespective of whether the causal 
arrow goes from redistributive institutions to high social trust (Rothstein 2011; Dinesen 2013) or the 
other way around (Bergh and Bjørnskov 2011, 2014; Daniele and Geys 2015), this strand of thought 
underlines the idea of societies entering virtuous (or vicious) cycles of high (low) trust, low (high) 
corruption, and high (low) government redistribution (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). Along similar 
lines, experiments using public goods games show more cooperative behavior—that is, higher support 
for social welfare—among high-trust individuals (Fehr and Leibbrandt 2011; Thöni, Tyran, and 
Wengström 2012). 
On the other hand, another line of scholarship conversely considers that it is actually high levels of 
corruption that impulse citizens to ask for more government intervention. If a society believes that 
“[…] corruption determine[s] wealth, it will levy high taxes” (Alesina and Angeletos 2005a, 960). This 
generates feedback mechanisms, because, in turn, “bigger governments raise the possibilities for 
corruption” (Alesina and Angeletos 2005b, 1227). If, on the contrary, “a society believes that 
individual effort determines income …, it will choose low redistribution and low taxes” (Alesina and 
Angeletos 2005a, 960). Similarly, if a society perceives most of its agents as untrustworthy, it will also 
demand more government regulation. For instance, if citizens believe most individuals will free ride 
and generate negative externalities such as environmental pollution, they will prefer command-and-
control solutions—such as strict regulation—over less restrictive alternatives (Harring 2016). 
Consequently, we have two types of societies or “two equilibria: a good one with a large share of civic 
individuals and no regulation, and a bad one, where a large share of uncivic individuals support heavy 
regulation” (Aghion et al. 2010, 1016).  
This paper aims to reconcile the findings of those scholars linking state intervention to civic behavior 
(or high trust) with those linking it to uncivic behavior (or low trust). In this sense, we follow recent 
work that has noted either the opposing effects of social trust on attitudes toward government 
intervention (Harring 2016; Pitlik and Kouba 2015) or the conditional effects of trust depending on 
the perceived quality of public institutions (Daniele and Geys 2015). Unlike the latter approach, which 
disentangles the effects of two different types of trust (social and institutional trust), the contribution 
of this paper is distinguishing between two types of state intervention—regulation and redistribution, 
 which act as partial substitutes of each other. 
Our view echoes empirical developments in comparative political economy that point out two distinct 
dimensions of government intervention (Hopkin and Blyth 2012; Hopkin, Lapuente, and Möller 
2013). On the one hand, countries that heavily regulate an economic sector (e.g., finance) also tend to 
heavily regulate others (e.g., labor and product markets). On the other, and quite puzzlingly, the 
intensity of government regulation is not correlated with levels of taxation and redistribution among 
advanced democracies. With the exception of Anglo-Saxon countries—that both regulate and 
redistribute relatively little—some countries seem to resort more to government regulation while 
others seem to resort more to taxation and redistribution. Take Denmark or Sweden, for example. 
They are low-regulated economies with high taxation; at the other extreme of the OECD, Spain and 
Japan are highly regulated economies with low taxation (Hopkin, Lapuente, and Möller 2013). Our 
paper aims to provide micro-foundations for these distinct types of intervention: why some 
governments do tend to regulate more while others do tend to redistribute more? We argue that why 
some societies marginally prefer regulatory solutions over tax-based ones may depend on the 
prevailing trust levels among their citizens, as well as the perceived quality of the institutions in their 
area of residence.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents three hypotheses on, on the one hand, 
the opposing effects of social trust on preferences for government intervention; and, on the other 
hand, on how the quality of government reinforces this relationship between trust and demand for 
government intervention. Our first hypothesis is that there should be a positive effect of social trust over 
citizens’ demands for redistributive policies. Our second hypothesis is that there should be a negative effect of 
social trust over citizens’ demand for government regulation. And our third hypothesis is that the (perceived) 
level of quality of government in a region conditions the link between social trust and demands for 
governmental intervention. In particular, we hypothesize that, the higher the level of quality of government in 
a region, the more its high-trusting individuals will demand more redistributive policies and less regulatory policies. 
Subsequently, we test these hypotheses using hierarchical regression models with the latest round of 
the European Quality of Government Index (EQI) survey, which questioned 77,000 individuals from 
fregions of 21 EU Member States. Results show that, controlling for a large series of aggregate and 
individual factors – such as income, education, ideology, age, gender –, those individuals who trust 
others tend to demand, ceteris paribus, less governmental regulation, and, at the same time, more 
government redistribution.  
Our results also show that this positive relationship between, on the one hand, high trust, and, on the 
other, high redistribution and low regulation, is weak in European regions with poor quality of 
government – e.g. Campania (Italy), Athens (Greece) or Bucharest (Romania). High-trusting 
individuals in these regions do not have very strong preferences either for redistributive policies or for 
a free market devoid of stringent regulations. Conversely, the link between social trust and demand 
for government intervention is very strong in regions with high quality of government. It is in places 
with high-perceived levels of quality of government, like Copenhagen (Denmark), Amsterdam 
 (Netherlands) or Åland (Finland), where social trust has a more significant both positive effect on the 
demand for redistribution and negative on the demand for regulation. It is in well-governed regions 
where high-trusting individuals develop both strong preferences for both a redistributive state and a 
free market that operates with minimal regulation. 
 
Theory 
The literature has noted the opposing effects of social trust attitudes toward state intervention (Pitlik 
and Kouba 2015). On the one hand, high social trust has been associated with a “stronger propensity 
to support government action” (Pitlik and Kouba 2015, 359). If you think others will use the welfare 
system appropriately, then you are more likely to contribute to it through paying high taxes (Daniele 
and Geys 2015). Similarly, people need to trust their fellow citizens in order to accept the individual 
costs of taxation, since paying taxes is a collective dilemma in itself (Scholz and Lubell 1998). People 
will not pay if they do not perceive that others pay their fair share of taxes. This could explain why 
historical levels of trust are correlated to current levels of social spending (Bergh and Bjørnskov 2011). 
In addition, the level of institutional trust—measured by the confidence of citizens in the impartiality 
of public institutions—has also been argued to positively affect people’s attitude toward government 
intervention (Hetherington 1998; Rothstein, Samanni, and Teorell 2012; Svallfors 2013; Daniele and 
Geys 2015). The support for high taxation spending should thus rise when citizens trust public 
institutions will manage tax revenues in an impartial and non-corrupt way (Svallfors 2013).  
On the other hand, high social trust has been linked to lower levels of other government intervention: 
the regulation of economic activities. For this “variety of government intervention” (Hopkin, 
Lapuente, and Möller 2013) that consists of economic regulation (instead of taxation), the effect of 
trust seems to be reverse. A society with high-trusting individuals may need less regulation. A 
mechanism would be that civicness replaces regulation: “higher generalized trust reduces requirements 
for economic regulation as it goes hand in hand with greater confidence in civicness of anonymous 
private market actors” (Pitlik and Kouba 2015, 359). If an individual thinks most other individuals are 
not trustworthy (i.e., if the social trust is low), they will want to punish them with stringent 
regulations. Empirically, Aghion et al. (2010) link low social trust to high government regulation by 
finding, using World Values Survey data, that less trustful individuals demand more business 
regulation because they expect entrepreneurs to be uncivic. Low-trust individuals demand would-be 
entrepreneurs to be subject to a more stringent set of administrative procedures, with restrictive 
limitations on when and how a business can be open and under which strict conditions employees 
may be hired and fired. Excessive regulation is not only economically inefficient (Djankov et al. 2002; 
Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003), but it also leads to more corruption opportunities: A vicious cycle 
emerges going from regulation to corruption, to mistrust, and, again, to more regulation. Likewise, 
Pinotti (2012) finds that low trust is associated with more market entry regulations.  
These findings are in line with the “unpleasant capitalist” hypothesis (Di Tella and MacCulloch 2009, 
p 294; Pitlik and Kouba 2015). Through stringent regulations, distrustful individuals want to punish 
 the people (capitalists) whom they regard as “bad” – even if that means that the strict regulations 
strangle the flourishment of a market. Put simply, when you do not trust others, you want a highly 
interventionist government (cf. Aghion et al. 2010; Pinotti 2012). Or, in other words, if you believe 
other players – with whom you are playing a game – will not play fairly, you may prefer the game not 
to take place to start with.  
Yet this relationship between, on the one hand, social trust, and, on the other, citizens’ preferences for 
a type of government intervention (redistribution or regulation) can also be conditioned by the quality 
of the institutions. Following a strand in the literature that has found the quality of public institutions 
– or the “quality of government” – as a core factor for understanding social well-being in a 
community (Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi 2009, Rothstein 2011), we define the quality of 
institutions as the ability a government has to treat its citizens equally. That is, quality of government 
is the impartiality in the exercise of power (Rothstein and Teorell 2008).  
From the literature on public policies, we know that impartial public institutions are important for 
creating large-scale collective projects, such as the design of welfare policies (Rothstein, 2001). And, 
from the experimental research, we know that, order to be willing to cooperate individuals need to 
possess both high social trust, but also a high level of trust in their institutions (Fehr and Leibbrandt 
2011; Thöni, Tyran, and Wengström 2012). 
We hypothesize that the context of the quality of institutions will influence the link between 
individuals’ levels of social trust and their preferences for more government intervention. In 
particular, one should expect that the effects social trust has over government intervention – i.e. that 
social trust fosters the demands for redistribution and reduces the demands for regulation – to be 
stronger in polities with high quality of government. For both redistributive policies and a market 
relatively free of regulations require impartial public institutions that aim at keeping the fairness of 
both the operations of a redistributive state and the operations of a free market.  
Let’s imagine two individuals, A and B, who have an equally high trust in other citizens – i.e. they 
have high levels of social trust. Therefore, both A and B tend to prefer a relatively low governmental 
regulation of the economy – i.e. they don’t think it is necessary the state to control the economic 
activities of other citizens and interfere with the workings of free market – and a relatively high levels 
of taxation – for they desire to redistribute resources to people they trust. Hence, that they do not 
think that poor or sick people are “cheaters” using the system. Yet A lives in a polity with high-quality 
institutions, where policies are well-known to be impartial and thus do not benefit entrenched 
interests. While, on the contrary, B is resident in a community with low quality of government, where 
citizens are aware policies are designed and implemented in a partial way that favors particular 
business interests, political friends and cronies at the expense of social welfare. One should expect 
that A will have a stronger preference for redistributive policies than B, for the latter cannot trust 
public institutions to use the collective resources in a wise way. B would like to redistribute resources 
to other fellow citizens, but does not strongly demand redistributive policies to a public administration 
she does not trust to impartially provide public goods. This interactive effect of the quality of 
 institutions and social trust for understanding the development of preferences for redistributive public 
goods has also been noted in the literature. In order to get the acceptance of individuals to pay taxes, 
we need what Fehr, Fischbacher, and Gächter (2008, 3) refer to as a social structure of both relatively 
high social trust and relatively high institutional trust (cf. Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Scholz and 
Lubell 1998). 
Conversely, individual A will, ceteris paribus, have a stronger preference for a free market – i.e. free of 
stringent regulations – than B. For A can trust both her fellow citizens to use market freedom in an 
honest way, and her public institutions not to opportunistically interfere in it to cater some 
competitors over others. B, being a high-trusting individual, will naturally prefer low limits to private 
entrepreneurship. Yet, since she cannot trust public institutions not to favor some favorite players in a 
given market, she may prefer to restrict the market itself. In other words, if you trust other players 
with whom you are playing a game, but you do not trust the referee will guarantee a fair play, you may 
not want to play the game to start with. 
In sum, we will test, on the one hand, two opposing hypotheses on the relationship between trust and 
government intervention, depending on the nature of such intervention. Regarding redistribution, 
individuals will have a stronger willingness to pay taxes and accept redistributive policies if they think 
other individuals will pay their fair share (i.e., if social trust is high). Yet, regarding government 
regulation, the relationship reverses. Low social trust lead to a higher demand for government 
regulation.  
Hypothesis 1: The more individuals trust their fellow citizens (i.e., social trust), the more positive their 
attitude toward government redistribution. 
Hypothesis 2: The less individuals trust their fellow citizens (i.e., social trust), the more positive their 
attitude toward strict government regulation that restricts the operations of free markets. 
On the other hand, we will also test a third hypothesis on how the effect of social trust is conditioned 
by the quality of institutions. We hypothesize that good governments increase both the positive effect 
that social trust has over individual preferences for a redistributive state and the positive effect that 
social trust has over individual preferences for a free market (i.e. for low regulation). 
Hypothesis 3a: The higher the quality of government in a polity, the more positive the effect of social 
trust over attitudes toward government redistribution.  
Hypothesis 3b: The higher the quality of government in a polity, the more positive the effect of social 
trust over attitudes toward free market and against government regulation. 
 
Method and Data 
Research Design, Data, Measurement and Estimation 
 
As our hypotheses regard how micro level trust and macro-level institutions affect individual level 
attitudes of redistribution and regulation, we employ a comparative, observational design, with data 
from the latest round of the European Quality of Government Index (EQI) survey.  The survey 
includes approximately 77,000 individuals from 185 regions in 21 EU Member States and was fielded 
 during the summer of 2017. The survey included several questions that capture the political values of 
the respondents, among them are two items that are of particular interest to this study. Our first 
dependent variable proxies for preferences for redistribution.   
‘How much do you agree with the following: 1-10, 1=strongly disagree, 10=strongly agree 
The government in [COUNTRY) should take measures to reduce differences in income 
Our second dependent variable pertains to preferences for regulation to what extent the respondents 
prefer state intervention in the free market.  We argue that this question is in fact more valid than a 
direct question on regulatory preferences as the word ‘regulation’ itself is technical and would likely 
lead to uninformed guessing in the responses. At the same time as redistribution can come through 
for example regulation (Castles, 2001): 
You prefer private ownership of business and industry over government ownership  
The variables are scaled in the direction that higher levels of the first and second dependent variable 
implies greater preferences for taxation and market (less regulation), respectively.  Figure 3 presents 
the weighted mean averages by country to highlight the macro-level variation in the data on our two 
dependent variables.  We see that countries such as Ireland and Denmark express rather liberal views 
(more government intervention and regulation) while respondents from countries such as Spain, 
Portugal and Slovakia prefer more active state intervention and redistribution.   
 
FIGURE 3, COUNTRY AVERAGES OF ECONOMIC PREFERENCES IN 21 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
Our main intendent variable at the micro level is a respondent’s level of social trust.  In this case, 
respondents are asked if they ‘trust other people in the in area’ from 1 (completely distrust) to 10 
(completely trust).   
 Other micro-level control variables include a measure of respondents’ ideological position broadly 
speaking, where we would anticipate that left-leaning people would on average support less market 
and more redistribution.  We capture this with the respondents’ preferred political party (‘if the 
election were held today, who would you vote for’).   Using coding from Nordsieck (2018), we code 
respondents as ‘1’ for left-support if their preferred party is a far-left, center-left or green party.  We 
also account for an individual’s socio-economic status with two variables – education and income.  As 
per income, respondents are coded in three ordered groups – low, middle and high, according to the 
income distributions in their own home country. Next, we also account for the respondent’s level of 
education. The EQI survey provides a variable for the highest level of schooling each respondent has 
completed.  Finally, we control for gender and age.   
On the macro-level, we account for two contextual factors that might confound the relationship 
between trust and preferences for state intervention – the level of economic development and the 
quality of institutions.  As regards the quality of institutions, we elect to measure institutions at the 
sub-national level rather than national. First, several studies have shown that the quality of institutions 
not only varies significantly across EU countries, but within them as well at the regional level 
(Charron et al., 2015). This allows us to capture the sub-national variation of these two indicates 
within countries; thus the sub-national level provides a more precision and stronger evidence our 
theory.i We proxy institutional quality with the 2013 version of the ‘European Quality of Government Index 
(EQI) (Charron et al., 2015), which to date is the best available proxy for the level of impartiality and 
corruption in regional public institutions.  For the level of economic development, we take a measure 
of GDP per capita, (PPP) from Eurostat for 2013 (logged), also at the sub-national level to capture 
within-country differences.   
With respect to our estimation methods, we elect to use ‘random intercept, random slope’ hierarchical 
estimation with random intercepts at the national level and random slopes for political trust1.  To test 
the conditional hypotheses, we present cross-level interaction models with random country intercepts.  
In later checks of robustness, we also present the results from the country fixed effect models, where 
survey weights are employed.  We estimate the following model: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗(𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠)
=  𝛼0𝑗 + 𝛽𝑖𝑗(𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡) + 𝜑𝑖𝑗 (𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) + 𝛿𝑘𝑗(𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) + 𝑢0𝑗
+ 𝑢1𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 represents the two outcomes – preferences for state intervention into the economy.  𝛼0𝑗 is the 
country level intercept and 𝑢0𝑗 represents the random intercept component.  𝛽𝑖𝑗 is the estimate of the 
main independent variable, social trust, for which we also include a random slope component (𝑢1𝑗) to 
account for the effects of trust that vary across countries. 𝜑𝑖𝑗 and 𝛿𝑘𝑗 represent the battery of micro 
and regional level controls, while 𝑒𝑖𝑗 is the random error at the individual level. 
                                                          
1 The variance of slopes for social trust were significant (p<0.001) in all models.  In addition, we tested for fixed effects and 
found that differences in estimates were negligible.  A Hausman tests confirms this.  We elect random effects therefore for 
efficiency and precision in terms of modelling the random slope effect of trust across countries.   
  
Results 
 
Figure 4 shows the visual summary of the four models – two baseline with trust only and two with 
controls.  The findings reveal that an increase in social trust results in an increase for preferences for 
the market over state intervention (less regulation), and higher support for redistribution (more 
taxation). 
The control variables are largely in the expected directions.  People who support left-leaning parties 
are also inclined to support more state intervention and more redistribution, while the opposite is the 
case for high income earners on average.  Women prefer slightly more state action on both outcome 
variables, while people living in higher areas of higher economic development prefer lower levels of 
redistribution on average.   
 
FIGURE 4, RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS – LEVEL OF SOCIAL TRUST & SUPPORT FOR MARKET AND 
REDISTRIBUTION 
 
Note: marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals. Fixed effects part shown only.   
 
To examine the relative impact of the variables, we report both marginal effects and standardized 
coefficients in Table 1, along with random and model components.  The variable with the largest 
effect in the model is ideology – left support, closely followed by social trust, and then by income.  As 
social trust is measured 0-1, the marginal effect represent the total effects of the variable, which 
constitute a standard deviation change of 0.20 and 0.27 of the redistribution and market variables 
respectively.  Finally, we observe that the random intercept and slope component in the model are 
statistically significant, indicating the average levels of dependent variables and the effect of trust vary 
significantly by country. 
 
  
TABLE 1, COMPARING THE RELATIVE EFFECTS: RANDOM INTERCEPT, RANDOM SLOPE MODELS 
 
 
Support for Redistribution  
 
Support for Market over State 
      
Variable 
change 
in dep. 
var. 
p-value 
 
change in 
dep. var. 
p-value 
fixed effects           
social trust 
     +1 S.D. 0.125 0.000 
 
0.166 0.000 
Marginal 0.546 0.000 
 
0.728 0.000 
Female 
     +1 S.D. 0.095 0.000 
 
-0.197 0.000 
Marginal 0.192 0.000 
 
-0.394 0.000 
Age 
     +1 S.D. 0.05 0.181 
 
0.05 0.366 
Marginal 0.049 0.181 
 
0.049 0.366 
Education 
      +1 S.D. -0.052 0.109 
 
0.098 0.042 
Marginal -0.049 0.109 
 
0.099 0.042 
Income (med) 
      +1 S.D. -0.042 0.288 
 
0.085 0.006 
Marginal -0.09 0.288 
 
0.186 0.006 
Income (high) 
      +1 S.D. -0.197 0.000 
 
0.225 0.000 
Marginal -0.425 0.000 
 
0.547 0.000 
Left-socialist party 
    +1 S.D. 0.218 0.004 
 
-0.313 0.000 
Marginal 0.557 0.004 
 
-0.801 0.000 
PPP (logged) 
     +1 S.D. -0.119 0.000 
 
0.047 0.000 
Marginal -0.30 0.000 
 
0.119 0.000 
EQI 2013 
     +1 S.D. -0.08 0.112 
 
0.018 0.015 
Marginal -0.083 0.112 
 
0.019 0.015 
 
constant 
 
9.711 
 
0.000 
 
 
4.605 
 
0.000 
   
 
  
Average prediction 7.30 
  
6.13 
 
  
  
 
 random effects           
country intercept 0.781 0.000 
 
0.667 0.000 
social trust 0.552 0.000 
 
0.632 0.000 
  
  
 
 Wald Chi2  434.6 0.000 
 
313.7 0.000 
Observations 77,387 
  
76,670 
 Note: results from random intercept, random slope (social trust) models.  P-values calculated from country-clustered standard errors. Both marginal 
effects and standardized coefficient (+1 S.D.) reported for purposes of comparison.   Reference category for income is ‘low’.   
 
Next, we test whether the findings in Table 1 for social trust are in fact conditioned by the 
 institutional context in which one resides.  To do so, we construct a cross-level interaction terms 
between our measure of regional level institutions (EQI) and social trust.  We re-ran the full models 
presented in Table 1 including the interaction term.  Figures 5 and 6 below elucidate the conditional 
relationship tested.   
We find quite similar results in both cases.  On the one hand, the effect of social trust on preferences 
for more or less state intervention is particularly pronounced for citizens living in regions with high 
levels of quality of government.  For example, for citizens living in regions one standard deviation 
above the mean in terms of QoG, the marginal (total) effect of a 0-1 increase in social trust is 0.8 and 
1.0 for redistribution and market preferences respectively.  On the other hand, the link between social 
trust and preferences for state intervention is essentially negligible at low levels of QoG within 
Europe, and for citizens living in regions at one standard deviation below the EQI mean, the effect of 
social trust on the outcomes is roughly half that compared to the effect at one standard deviation 
above the EQI mean.   
 
FIGURE 5, THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL TRUST ON PREFERENCES FOR REDISTRIBUTION OVER 
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
FIGURE 6, THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL TRUST ON PREFERENCES FOR FREE MARKET OVER 
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY  
 
 
 
In sum, both Hypothesis 1—the more individuals trust their fellow citizens, the more positive their 
attitude toward government taxation, measured by support for redistribution —and Hypothesis 2—
the less individuals trust their fellow citizens, the more positive their attitude toward government 
regulation—are supported by the data. Finally, a line with Hypothesis 3, the positive effect of (social 
and institutional) trust on individual preferences for taxation and the negative effect on individual 
preferences for regulation are found both when looking at individual trust as well as a contextual 
effect when looking at the aggregate level of trust in the country. Whether you as an individual trust 
institutions and your fellow citizens matters for your policy preferences, and furthermore, whether 
you as an individual live in a society where there is a prevailing trust norm or not also matters for your 
policy preferences. The higher one’s level of trust, the more likely you are willing to support more 
state intervention in terms of taxes and economic redistribution, at the same time, the less likely you 
are to support more government regulation. 
In addition, we find that the link between social trust and economic preferences are most pronounced 
in areas where institutional quality is highest.   
 
Robustness Checks 
We begin by running re-running the models using a country fixed effects estimation in lieu of the 
random intercept random slope approach.  Next, we check whether respondents from one country in 
particular are driving any of our findings.  To do so, we re-run the estimate using a country-level 
 bootstrap, whereby each country is removed one at a time and the results are compared to the original 
models presented in the previous section. Third, we check whether the effect of social trust on 
economic preferences are consistent when including a control measure for political trust.   
 
Conclusions 
This paper has aimed to explore, at the micro-level, the contradictory relationship that we observe, at 
the macro-level, between the average levels of trust in a country and two different types of 
government intervention: regulation and redistribution. Why do governments in high-trust countries 
(e.g., Sweden and Denmark) tend to regulate relatively little in their economies while, at the same time, 
they impose high taxes and redistribution? Equally, why do relatively low-trust societies (e.g., Greece 
and Turkey) tend to have governments that regulate a lot but tax little? 
Though a full account of this puzzle is outside the scope of this paper, we contribute to the literature 
in three ways. In the first place, by disentangling the effects of trust over regulation and redistribution, 
the paper helps to reconcile two contradictory views on the role of social trust. On the one hand, 
those who, like Alesina and Angeletos (2005), Aghion et al. (2010), or Pinotti (2012), link low trust to 
higher government intervention. On the other, those who, like Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) or 
Rothstein (2011), link low trust to low government intervention. Redistribution can come through 
regulation (Castles, 2001) but we argue that the difference between these two approaches is that they 
refer to two distinct forms of government intervention that, far from being correlated, may act as 
partial substitutes. Facing a collective problem, for instance a disruptive technological innovation that 
threatens local business, governments may either restrict the new economic activity, preventing the 
flourishment of a free market. Or, alternatively, governments may demand taxes to compensate the 
“losers” and, for instance, fund retraining programs.  
Our second contribution is arguing that the fact that some societies marginally prefer one type of 
government intervention (regulation) over the other (redistribution) may depend on the level of social 
trust. Partly, our argument follows the lines of Berggren and Bjørnskov (2017), who note how social 
trust may affect regulation through numerous mechanisms. A country with high social trust can more 
easily overcome the obstacles in the political process—coming from ideology or from political 
instability—that prevent governments from deregulating an economy with liberalizing reforms. If you 
believe others can be trusted, will stick to their word, and will not exploit you, you will be more open 
to accept the dismantling of economic regulations (Berggren and Bjørnskov 2017). And, at the same 
time, as it has also been noted in the literature, you will be more willing to pay taxes (Scholz and 
Lubell 1998). Similar to both lines of research, our results show those high-trust individuals are less 
willing to support regulation and more willing to support taxation.  
Third, while most of the scholarship has focused on the relationship between social trust and 
government intervention, our findings show the trust citizens have in their institutions —i.e. the 
perceived level of quality of government – also exerts an important role. In those European regions 
where individuals perceive that public institutions act in an impartial way, the level of social trust does 
seem to have a stronger effect on preferences for redistributive and regulatory policies. On the one 
 hand, this finding is akin to previous results indicating that when individuals have confidence in the 
impartiality of public institutions, they have a more positive attitude toward taxation (Hetherington 
1998; Rothstein, Samanni, and Teorell 2012; Svallfors 2013; Daniele and Geys 2015). On the other, 
the quality of government also enhances the negative effect that social trust has on the demands for 
more governmental regulation that has been documented in the literature (e.g. Aghion et al. 2010).  
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